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On 'Empire', Imperialism, and 
Sovereignty 
Pablo de Orellana 
 
 
From the advent of Christianity in late 
Antiquity to the onset of early colonialism, 
debates about empire have revolved 
around divine and natural right. Vitoria 
rejected that monarchy derived its 
sovereignty 'from the commonwealth or 
from men'.
1
 In a paradoxical parallel, it is 
interesting to consider that pre-Christian 
Roman sovereignty was occupied by the 
containment of the demands of the plebs, a 
concern that Marxism and Hardt and Negri 
brought back to thought about political 
sovereignty. Vitoria's main concern on 
sovereignty was territoriality, and he was 
at pains to discuss whether savages in the 
Americas were infideles, amentes or 
insensati and thus liable to enlightened 
dominium.
2
 It is precisely this view of 
sovereignty, as based on the unreadiness of 
entire populations for self-rule and peace, 
that underpinned European colonial 
discourse. Classical notions of empire first 
and foremost include the projection of 
military, political and economic power 
outside the nation-state. This projection 
might be direct or indirect, informal or 
formal, but in any case does not necessitate 
the imposition of sovereignty upon other 
territories. 
 
If one is to consider the contemporary 
international order, it seems unavoidable to 
at least consider it as a system dominated 
by a hegemon. The Project for a New 
American Century seeks to reaffirm 
'American global leadership' for the 
purpose of 'extending an international 
order friendly to our security, our 
prosperity, and our principles'.
3
 Ferguson 
argues that '“hegemony” is just a way to 
avoid talking about empire, “empire” 
being a word to which most Americans 
remain averse. But “empire” has never 
exclusively meant direct rule over foreign 
territories'.
4
 All of these notions of empire 
regard power, its exercise and modus 
vivendi as the utmost expression of the 
modern state. The modern state is thus the 
main producer of subjectivities through 
discipline and especially biopower with 
which it has an existential nexus through 
the very protection of life.
5
 The state is 
also the most observable actor in the 
conduct of international relations, being 
both the container and defender of its 
biopolitical subjects.  
 
Hardt and Negri, however, challenge this 
perception and argue that the international 
is mutating into an order of economic 
globalization that engulfs and supersedes 
the crisis-stricken modern state under 'a 
single logic of rule' that creates the 
condition of possibility for action by 
agents within Empire.
6
 In this contribution, 
I explore the extent to which the notion of 
'Empire' is useful in understanding 
contemporary international politics. The 
thesis of Empire shall be outlined first. The 
analysis will then focus on their 
conception of modern sovereignty and 
imperialism, which are the most 
contentious issues of Empire in 
considering the contemporary global 
political order. I shall not, however, 
explore the Marxist contradictions of 
'Empire' or its reformulation of the 
proletariat as 'Multitude' given the priority 
of the purpose of this analysis. Finally, I 
shall attempt to offer an alternative 
conceptualisation of the role of power 
projection in the international in relation to 
economic globalisation as one based on 
economic terraforming as a form of 
economic conditioning.  
 
'Empire' 
The state as producer of subjectivity is, in 
Hardt and Negri's view, experiencing a 
moment of crisis and challenge. Empire 
details the forces and new subjectivities 
that they consider as symptomatic of 
change currently underway. Most 
important for their thesis is the 
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globalisation of world markets that 'tends 
to deconstruct the boundaries of the 
nation-state'.
7
 They see the recreation of 
enemies through subjectivities in the 
Western discourse of fundamentalism as 
an essentially anti-modern depiction: 
'counter to modernism's dynamic and 
secular society, fundamentalism seems to 
pose a static and religious one'.
8
 The 
creation of subjectivity, they argue, like 
that of the world market, and with 
fundamentalism as an enemy, is one that 
de-emphasises the state in favour of post-
modern, global, and non-state actors. The 
demise of the Soviet Union led to the 
creation of paradigms for good and evil 
that are global, hence spinning the wheel 
of a global-level biopolitical technology of 
power. 
 
Empire is not a continuation of 
imperialism for it relies on a subjectivity 
not based in sovereignty;
9
 it does not 
depend on state subjectivity but on a de-
centralised, de-territorialised, unjuridical, 
economic capitalist power machine: the 
ultimate evolution of capitalism beyond 
imperialism. Empire creates subjectivities 
that are based on he biopolitical nexus of 
production, life, and peace as first 
articulated by Michel Foucault. 'What 
Foucault fails to grasp finally are the real 
dynamics of production in biopolitical 
society', they argue, and needs the addition 
of the Marxist's focus on production: 'life 
is made to work for production and 
production is made to work for life'.
10
 
 
Empire is a producer of subjectivities 
currently coexisting with modern ones. 
These are centred around an immanent 
inner biopolitical circle linking labour (of 
the Multitude, the subject of biopower) 
and production, and an outer circle, at the 
global level, of action and consensus with 
a biopolitical need for peace, stability and 
the market.
11
 Empire is thus a 'globalized 
biopolitical machine' that renders its power 
absolute through the 'complete immanence 
to the ontological machine of production 
and reproduction, and thus to the 
biopolitical context.'
12
 Ontologically, 
Empire creates the condition of possibility 
for agents (capital) to act. This global 
order is defined by its very virtuality, its 
dynamism and 'its functional 
inconclusiveness'.
13
 This double circle also 
explains, in their model, the subjectivity 
behind the articulation of intervention: an 
exception to the peace etc. pertinent to the 
biopolitical circle can result in 
intervention, moral (NGO's and other 
'moral' forces) as well as forcible.
14
 The 
'symbolic production of the Enemy' arises 
from its particularisation as an exception to 
the peace of the biopolitical regime, and 
therefore military intervention 'is presented 
as an internationally sanctioned police 
action'.
15
 Interventions 'are always 
exceptional even though they arise 
continually' and Hardt and Negri see its 
form as policing 'because they are aimed at 
maintaining an internal order'.
16
 
 
Globalisation is a most pertinent obstacle 
for the consideration of sovereignty in late 
modernity: it escapes the control of the 
state as the primary human and spatial 
unit, it is a major factor in the relative 
welfare of any individual and 
interconnects states and people the world 
over. The positioning of the globalisation 
of world economy in IR is problematic to 
the point that Empire is helpful in 
reconsidering our position in regards to the 
limits, theory and subjectivity of the state 
as the unit of analysis and demarcation. 
Barkawi and Laffey suggest that the 
challenge of Empire has highlighted that 
IR's central categories of sovereignty and 
the nation-state 'generate a systematic 
occlusion of the imperial and global 
character of world politics'.
17
 Taking the 
imperial seriously, they argue, allows for 
an understanding of sovereignty located 'in 
histories of European expansion and 
engagement with the world outside the 
West'.
18
 This is in tension with a view of 
world politics focused on the state that 
leaves the international as a small space of 
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25 
strategic, diplomatic and economic 
interaction: the 'territorial trap'. Hardt and 
Negri see the international as a wider 
space of social relations and struggle that 
results in a mutually constitutive 
perception of the formation of modern 
sovereignty. Europe is thus contextualised 
and provincialised: The Westphalian state 
appears thus the result of interaction and 
mutual constitution in the international. 
Their understanding of globalisation as a 
new form of global power is, at least, 
helpful in understanding the current global 
political order as interconnected, mutually 
constitutive and decidedly transnational 
and also significantly “updates” and 
challenges notions of power projection in 
the international. 
 
The end of Modernity? 
Hardt and Negri argue that state 
sovereignty in its modern sense is being 
absorbed and smoothed into a global 
continuum such that 'at the highest level, 
one could say that only Empire (and no 
longer any nation-state) is capable of 
sovereignty in a full sense.'
19
 This is highly 
problematic, not only with regards to US 
hegemony, but most importantly from the 
theoretical claim in that it appears to 
assume that Westphalian sovereignty was 
ever perfect, impermeable in its borders, 
permanent in its contents, in the preceding 
times of imperialism. I would argue that 
the modern state has never been in stasis, 
but is rather constantly relative and 
relational, responding to its own perceived 
existence, constantly reproducing its 
national subjectivity.
20
 This happened in 
France with Sarkozy's brutal claims and 
legislation concerning French identity; 
David Cameron has recently claimed that 
multiculturalism has failed in the UK and 
that “britishness” must be demanded of 
migrants. 
 
The borders, both geographical and 
theoretical, of the modern state, were not, 
and are not, in a stasis of containment of 
their peoples. Even when they were not 
responsible for the movement of masses, 
movements happened, often on a massive 
scale; one has only to think of the great 
Irish and Italian migrations of the 
nineteenth century. The movement of 'the 
multitude' is no freer in contemporary 
times that hitherto: even though the EU 
might seem like an Imperial example of 
multitude movement, though making 
internal frontiers more fluid, it has made 
the external ones more impermeable than 
before. This brings us back to the role of 
the state and in the EU each development 
is a state-negotiated treaty - which explains 
the endemic impotence of the European 
Parliament. 'Undesirable flows' are being 
controlled not only in terms of migration 
but also in trade; the EU keeps stringent 
restraints on imports of food stuffs that 
might compete with European agriculture. 
Even the world of capital is not 'smooth'. 
 
The state remains firmly grounded in its 
modern role as guarantor and provider of 
space for rights, citizenship, political 
action (taxation and welfare for 
instance).
21
 So much so that many social 
groups around the globe seek statehood as 
the guarantee of rights and political part-
taking for their peoples – as we have seen 
in the Balkans, Kurdistan, Burma, Spain, 
France, etc.
22
 The state, I contend, is still 
the main producer and reproducer of 
identity, historicity – the antithetical 
“other” - and the ultimate zone of 
inclusion and the defence of life. 
Sovereign state subjectivity, within the 
epistemological condition of Westphalian 
modern capitalism, like power, is not 
possessed but rather practised through the 
ontological conditioning of its biopolitical 
subjects. 
 
Walker highlights the issue, claiming 
immanence 'in the philosophical struggles 
of early European modernity with a claim 
about the imminence of a new form of 
political order arising from a process of 
internalisation of interstate system'. He 
contents Hardt and Negri's 'founding 
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binary' of 'transcendence and sovereignty 
as a counter-revolution against 
immanence'.
23
 I am convinced by Walker's 
counterargument that 'the immanent 
critique of modernity does not 
automatically translate into an account of a 
politics that involves bringing the outside 
inside'.
24
 This renders unsustainable the 
narrative in 'Empire' of enclosure and unity 
towards Imperial unity and organised 
difference. This is seriously limiting, for it 
not only invites a counter argument based 
on Imperialism, but also seems to ignore 
the contemporary practice of sovereignty 
itself, novel forms of governance and 
resurrected/ new/ revolutionary claims to 
sovereignty. 
 
The Empire Strikes Back: Economic 
Terraforming 
The actualisation of a state's international 
practice is thus still relevant to the point 
that major powers can still provide 
sponsorship to other actors - a projection 
of power.
25
 The capacity of a state to 
provide sponsorship to another brings us to 
question Empire's claim that imperialism 
has collapsed in the face of the 'attempt to 
quench an insatiable thirst' of capitalism 
towards 'being a world power, or really the 
world power'.
26
 They see Empire as the 
response of capital to the subjectivity of 
class struggle through a process of 
internalising the international. 
27
 
 
America, the usual suspect, is in their view 
defeated in its imperialism in 1968.
28
 This, 
as Barkawi and Laffe argue, did not stop 
the US from interventionism. Indeed, the 
view that Western imperialism is static in 
form and practice is misleading and deeply 
Eurocentric. Imperialism evolved in a 
mutually constitutive development with its 
opponents with an infinity of US and 
European interventions, direct, indirect, 
formal, covert, and in the form of 
international sponsorship, for decades in 
all parts of the globe.
29
 
 
I remain unconvinced that there is no 
continuity between imperialism and 
Empire. This is because I am unready to 
accept American exceptionalism in regards 
to imperialism. Most importantly, due to 
their historical narrative linking a static 
notion of European sovereignty abroad 'as 
a machinery of borders and limits' whereas 
the US is instead replicating its 
constitution globally.
30
 It is problematic 
that they link the break from modern 
imperialism to post-modern Empire with 
separation, inclusion and exclusion, and 
this rests mostly on Empire's consideration 
of the US within the world. 
 
American exceptionalism, especially as 
coded in their openly anti-colonial 
constitution and national discourse and 
debate from the late 1800s, is rooted on a 
Eurocentric notion of sovereignty and 
imperialism associated to colonialism.
31
 
Said acknowledges that US imperialism 
utilises other means, informal rather than 
territorial colonialism, but 'the tactics of 
the great empires, which were dismantled 
after the First World War, are being 
replicated by the US'.
32
 Hardt and Negri 
charge Said with not taking a step further 
and recognising that the US is not 
imperialist but it's rather a crucial part of 'a 
fundamentally new form of rule'.
33  
 
The expansion of capital markets and loci 
of productions has long been the target of 
liberal regimes. Hence, the process of 
capital expansion to a global level, whilst 
never as intensive and extensive as 
presently, also informed the agenda of 
classical imperialism, such that even 
Spanish expansion in the Americas by the 
likes of Pizarro, Cortes and Orellana, was 
not only a quest to impose sovereignty 
abroad, but rather one led by pioneering, 
although brutal, seekers of wealth. The 
British conquest of India was initiated as 
assistance to the plea of the East India 
Company that was unable to cope with 
local resistance. A stark example were the 
Opium Wars, fought in the 1800s to force a 
market (China) to open to the narcotic 
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produce of British colonies. Hardt and 
Negri are not the first to place the 
projection of political power as informed 
by economic ambitions. They do 
nonetheless propose an understanding of 
globalisation that at least forces us to 
reconsider the role of capital in the 
contemporary global order. Instead of 
absorbing markets, capital is using 
American influence to internalise markets 
abroad.
34
  
 
Whilst the implications for sovereignty of 
the thesis of 'Empire' are unconvincing, the 
notion of economic conditioning as a 
major factor behind economic 
globalisation is one that needs serious 
consideration. I argue that this form of 
power projection in the international 
consists of “economic terraforming” 
through state power and the extended 
reach of international organizations that 
essentially terraform, adapt and prepare the 
economic landscape. This, however, is in 
my view an extension and latently 
contemporary form of imperialism, for it 
depends on the projection of the power of 
states for the favourable conditioning of 
foreign markets and loci of production. 
Contrary to 'Empire', this is a process that 
itself requires the collaboration of 
acquiescent states in order to reach 
implementation. This dependence on the 
projection of state power is not only clear 
in the obvious political and military 
interventions, but also in the asymmetrical 
roles of international organisations and 
treaties like IMF, WB, WTO, GATT. These 
are ruled by inter-state treaties and are 
funded by its most powerful members. 
They do not impose Imperial sovereignty 
world-wide, but rather work, through 
sovereign states, to create economic 
conditions for capital expansion. This is 
clearly comparable to the aftermath of the 
Opium Wars, in which China was forced to 
legalise the opium trade for the benefit of 
French and especially British trade.  
 
The values, influence and power of 
modernity in the liberal project are still 
politically dominant when considering the 
paradigm of sovereignty as well as 
imperialism. In 2011, The Provisional 
Libyan Council of Governance issued a 
statement of purpose coded in 
unequivocally modern terms: 'Wholesome 
sentiments about the social contract, civil 
society, political obligation, and the true 
awfulness of discrimination (in any shape 
or form) inform its ineffably do-gooding 
intent'.
35
 There is an inescapable continuity 
in values and tactics in contemporary 
imperialism. Retuning to the Project for 
the New American Century, there is still 
will in the US for 'preserving and 
extending an international order friendly to 
our security, our prosperity and our 
principles […] to ensure our security and 
our greatness'. Both of these are clearly re-
framing exercises in what concerns the 
sovereign states, rather than an 
overcoming of the state paradigm. Indeed, 
the above examples show that the state is 
still the main - and essential - conveyor of 
normative initiatives from abroad. As is 
clear with the institutions and treaties 
governing global financial and industrial 
transactions like WB or GATT, they too 
depend upon states to terraform territories 
and populations for economic participation 
in a globalised market.  
 
Hardt and Negri's conceptualisation of a 
post-modern global order engulfing state 
sovereignty and, through the production of 
new subjectivities, heralding the slow 
transition away from modernity, is 
unconvincing. Their thesis is compromised 
by the Eurocentrism of their framework of 
sovereignty as well as the acceptance of 
American exceptionalism. IR is, however, 
enriched by their conceptualization of 
globalisation as an immanent producer of 
biopolitical subjectivities based on a link 
between production and life.  
 
The contemporary global political order 
cannot, however, be described as Empire, 
for I must contend with the image of a 
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global sovereignty and a discontinuity 
between the latter and imperialism. 
Imperialism has, however, developed its 
most powerful tool: “economic 
terraforming”. This is a development of 
imperialism, not a throwback to former 
practices of imperialism.
 
We may speak of 
economic terraforming as the practice of 
the very essence of imperium
36
, and 
conclude that the contemporary political 
order is the result of the wielding of 
imperium by leading economic actors. 
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